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Monetary Policy Spillover into a Developing Country When the US Federal Fund 
Rate Rises: Evidence on a Bank Lending Channel 
 
Daiju Aiba*  
 
Abstract 
Banks in developing countries are highly dependent on funding sources from abroad, and such 
high dependency on external funding could cause vulnerability to the sector by channeling the 
effects of foreign monetary policies to domestic bank lending. In this paper, we study the 
international transmission of monetary policy of US and banks’ major shareholders’ home 
countries into bank lending in Cambodia, using data on banks’ loan disbursement and balance 
sheets from 2013Q1 to 2019Q2. Cambodia is one of the least developed countries in the 
south-east Asian region, while its economy is highly dollarized and capital movement is free. 
This environment is likely to allow banks to transmit financial shocks into domestic lending. 
As a result, we find that US monetary policy affected domestic lending through the channel of 
foreign funding exposure, suggesting that Cambodian banks with foreign funding exposure are 
likely to reduce lending when there is a rise in the cost of funding from abroad. We also find 
that an increase in the US monetary policy rate is associated with increases in loan 
disbursements in secured loans, USD currency loans, and retail loans, suggesting the monetary 
transmission also affected loan reallocations by changing risk-taking behavior in bank lending. 
In addition, we find that these results are robust for US monetary policy effects, but weak and 
not robust for monetary policies of banks’ major shareholders’ home countries.  
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1. Introduction 
As economic integration has deepened over the world, developing countries have increasingly 
faced a flood of capital inflows. While the increasing capital inflows support economic growth, 
they also affect bank domestic lending both directly and indirectly, and can lead to financial 
instability (Baskaya et al., 2017). Banking sectors in some developing countries are highly 
dependent on funding sources from abroad as a result of a lack of stable domestic funding 
sources or lax regulations on entries of foreign banks (Korinek, 2018). Higher dependency on 
foreign funding sources could create risks for the banking sector, since banks might not be able 
to completely offset the decline of their foreign funds by raising capital from domestic sources 
due to imperfections in the capital market (Jeon et al., 2013). In other words, those banks would 
decrease their lending in the wake of sudden stop or an increase in costs of foreign funding. In 
fact, during the period of financial crisis, banks in many countries suffered from quick 
withdrawals of wholesale funding (Cao & Dinger, 2018). Guo and Stepanyan (2011) have 
shown that aggregated credit growth in countries in which banking sectors are dependent on 
foreign funding is more likely to be affected by the fluctuations of foreign funding flows. In 
addition, there are several empirical studies showing that global banks transmit financial shocks 
within home countries to their subsidiaries (Peek & Rosengren, 1997; De Haas & Levy, 2010; 
North & Busch, 2016, 2017). Furthermore, the impact of the external shocks is more severe in 
developing countries where capital markets are underdeveloped and domestic funds are not 
always stable.  
This paper investigates a channel of monetary policy transmission into a banking sector 
of a developing country through foreign funding exposure of each individual bank. 1  
                                            
1 We define foreign funding exposure mainly through two variables. One is non-resident liabilities 
defined as the sum of wholesale funding from abroad, deposits from foreign banks, and non-resident 
deposits. Another is foreign liabilities from banks abroad defined as the sum of wholesale funding from 
abroad, deposits from foreign banks (non-resident liabilities minus non-resident deposits). Resident 
deposits can be held by Cambodian citizens or foreigners who have lived in the country for more than 
182 days in a row. Otherwise, foreigners can only open non-resident deposit accounts. 
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Specifically, we investigate the effect of the increase in US monetary policy rate from 2015Q4 
and also other countries’ monetary policy on domestic lending through non-resident funding into 
Cambodian commercial banks.2  Cambodia is a small open economy and one of the most 
dollarized economies in the world, and capital movement is free. Buch et al. (2018) empirically 
documented that a country with free capital movement and a fixed exchange rate policy would 
likely transmit the foreign countries’ monetary policy. Therefore, the effects of US and other 
foreign countries’ policies are likely to affect foreign funding in the Cambodian banking sector 
as well.3  In fact, Cambodian banks have experienced a decline in the flow of non-resident 
liabilities, after the US federal fund rate started increasing. In Figure 1, we present the average, 
median, and 25-75 percentile ranges of distributions of the ratios of non-resident liabilities to 
total liabilities in Cambodian banks, and also show the interest rates of Federal Fund overnight 
as the US monetary policy rate. During the period, the medium values increased to more than 
10% in 2015Q4, suggesting that half of Cambodian banks were highly dependent on 
non-resident liabilities. Meanwhile, all of the statistics in Figure 1 have decreased after 2015Q4, 
suggesting that most banks have experienced decreases in the ratio of non-resident liabilities to 
total liabilities after the US federal fund rate started increasing. In the wake of the tightening of 
US monetary policy, Cambodian banks faced an increase in the cost of funding from abroad, 
which might affect the domestic lending due to limited substitutability for domestic funding 
sources.4  This transmission of monetary policy might be intense particularly for banks which 
are highly dependent on non-resident liabilities.  
                                            
2 Our interest in foreign funding flows are non-resident liabilities, and foreign liabilities taken from 
bank abroad of bank balance sheets (footnote 3). Also, equity finance is not possible to separate the 
abroad and domestic sources. But the equity finance from abroad need a permission from a central bank. 
Thus, it is not as flexibly meet the demand for collecting funding as wholesale borrowing from parent 
bank and other related party. 
3 Debola et al. (2018) also find the effect of US monetary policy on other countries’ economic 
conditions. Their findings suggest that, if the exchange rate regime is fixed and the limit on capital 
mobility is small, spillover effects of US monetary policy is stronger. 
4 Even though Cambodia is highly dollarized, the interest rates on domestic USD deposits did not 
change during the period when US federal fund rate increased. Thus, the changes in US monetary policy 
affected Cambodian banks thorough non-resident sources. 
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Figure 1: Ratio of Non-Resident Liabilities to Total Liabilities (Left) and US Monetary Policy 
Rate (Right) 
Source: National Bank of Cambodia, and authors’ 
calculation.  
Source: Data is from the International Financial 
Statistics, and author’s calculations.US monetary 
policy is the interest rate of Feral Funds 
overnight. In this study, we exploit the unique 
data showing the exact amounts of the whole 
non-resident. 
  In this study, we exploit the unique data showing the exact amounts of the whole 
non-resident liabilities and foreign liabilities from banks abroad at the individual bank level, 
respectively. We construct the panel data from balance sheets of commercial banks on a 
quarterly basis from 2013Q1 to 2019Q2. The data allow us to examine the transmission channel 
of US monetary policy through foreign funding exposure, such as the whole non-resident 
liabilities and foreign liabilities from banks abroad. In addition, we use the disaggregated data of 
amounts of newly disbursed loans by currencies, maturities, security, and sectors. This detailed 
loan data allows us to understand the effects of periodic changes in demand and supply factors of 
certain types of loans. Using this data, we examine whether US monetary policy transfers to 
Cambodian banks’ domestic lending. Furthermore, we examine which loan characteristics are 
more prone to increases in funding costs from abroad. Apart from US monetary policy, we also 
examine the effects of foreign countries’ monetary policies. Specifically, we examine the effect 
of changes in monetary policy rates in the home countries of the bank’s major shareholders. As 
the result, we find that changes in monetary policy have negative impacts on a bank’s domestic 
lending if it has exposure to foreign funding, with the impact becoming larger as the exposure 
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increases. We also find that changes in US monetary policy also affected the loan composition of 
Cambodian commercial banks. In particular, an increase in the US monetary policy rate is 
associated with a longer maturity of loans, and more provision of retail loans and USD currency 
loans. It might suggest that an increase in funding cost led Cambodian banks to shift loan 
allocations to lower risk sector and clients. Furthermore, we find that the monetary policies of 
banks’ shareholders’ home countries are not strongly associated with Cambodian bank’s 
domestic lending compared to US monetary policy, although there was a distributional effect on 
some specific loan types, such as USD and long-term loans. Lastly, we find that the changes in 
non-resident liabilities are associated with the US federal fund rate, but other funding sources, 
such as domestic deposits and equity, are not associated with the US federal fund rate or other 
foreign countries’ monetary policy rates at statistical significance. These findings suggest that 
foreign monetary policy could transmit to a developing country through changes in foreign 
funding exposure to local banks. 
There is vast literature on international monetary transmission through global banks 
(Peek & Rosengren, 1997; De Haas & Lelyveld, 2006, 2010; Jeon et al., 2013; Ongena et al., 
2015; Bruno & Shin, 2015; Temesvary et al., 2018; Buch et al., 2018). Ongena et al. (2015) 
investigated the transmission of foreign financial shocks on bank domestic lending through the 
internal capital market and found that wholesale funding and foreign ownership is a key factor to 
transmitting the shocks in a home country to a host country. Temesvary et al. (2018) investigated 
US monetary policy’s effect on cross-border lending and affiliate lending of US banks, and 
found that the monetary policy both of destinated countries and US are associated with 
cross-border lending of global banks. Although there is vast literature on the international 
transmission of financial shocks and monetary policy on domestic lending and cross-border 
lending, studies on the international transmission on domestic lending in developing countries 
are still limited (Buch et al., 2018). Our study complements the literature by investigating 
domestic bank lending in a less developed country. As of 2019Q2, 35 out of 44 commercial 
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banks in Cambodia have more than half their shares owned by foreigners; the nationalities of 
those shareholders vary widely across developed countries and neighboring Asian countries. In 
line with Ongena et al. (2015), our study shows that US monetary policy influences domestic 
lending within one of the least developed countries. Furthermore, several empirical studies 
documented the risk-taking channel of domestic and foreign monetary policy, finding that lower 
policy rates shift the allocation of banks toward more risky borrowers (Jiménez et al., 2014, for 
Spain; Ioannidou et al., 2015, for Bolivia). Similarly, by employing the detailed data by loan 
characteristics, our study finds that an increase in US monetary policy rates led to a shift of loan 
provisions to lower risk-profile loans, such as secured loans, consumer loans, long maturity 
loans, and USD loans.5  
Our results also emphasize the importance of reliance on internal capital market and 
foreign funding sources. During the global financial crisis period, the increases in the cost of 
funding from internal capital markets affected bank domestic lending. Jeon et al. (2013) found 
that foreign subsidiaries with a shortage of their own internal funds are more likely to be affected 
by the financial shocks on their parent banks’ markets. In contrast to Jeon et al., we use two 
measures to study the channel of international monetary transmission via reliance on foreign 
funding sources not limited to parent banks: the ratio of the entire non-resident liabilities to total 
liabilities and the ratio of foreign liabilities from banks abroad to total liabilities, respectively. 
We find similar results showing that if the banks collect funds from foreign funding sources 
(non-resident deposits or wholesale funding from abroad), US monetary policy has led to a 
decrease in domestic bank lending. In addition, we find that local-owned banks with a high 
dependency on foreign funding are more impacted by the increase in US monetary policy than 
their foreign-owned peers. Presumably, this reflects the fact that local-owned banks have less 
                                            
5 In Cambodia, the interest rates on USD loans are lower than local loans. Thus, the USD loans are 
provided to lower risk profile borrowers generally. For retail loans, although the interest rates are not 
necessarily lower than corporate loans, the size of loans are much smaller and mainly include a 
collateral requirement. Thus, the risk-profile is lower for retail loans.  Regarding the provision of USD 
and local currency loans by Cambodian banks, Aiba & Sok (2017), Aiba et al. (2018), and Okuda (2018) 
analyze survey data on the currency denominations of bank loans to households and enterprises. 
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access to internal capital markets, implying that a high dependency on foreign funding for 
local-owned banks could be a cause of vulnerability within the financial sector. North and Busch 
(2016, 2017) and Kneer et al. (2019) also found that changes in foreign funding significantly 
affect bank domestic lending in Brazil and UK, respectively. Our paper provides the additional 
insights that foreign funding exposure could be the source of vulnerability within the banking 
sector via transmission of other countries’ monetary policy.  
Our paper also provides additional insights on monetary transmission in partially 
dollarized economies. Several studies find that the domestic monetary policy is limited in fully 
and partially dollarized countries, while bank lending is often affected by US monetary policy 
(Mora, 2013; Onegena et al., 2017). Our study finds that USD denominated deposits and the 
degree of dollarization are not necessarily the channel of monetary transmission. As we will 
show in the paper, interest rates on USD did not changed significantly after the US monetary 
policy started rising. Thus, the effects of foreign monetary policy was likely to be channeled 
through foreign funding exposure in the case of Cambodia. This result indicates that even in a 
dollarized economy, banks could mitigate the effect of foreign monetary policy by shifting to 
domestic deposits as a major funding source.  
Our paper is also related to the literature of the role of ownership structure on a bank’s 
lending and performance. The effect of foreign ownership is mixed. In developing countries, it is 
assumed that foreign-owned banks have the advantage of access to international capital market 
and the funding from a parent company abroad, and numerous studies provide the evidence of 
superiority of foreign ownership. However, Okuda and Aiba (2016) found that the performance 
of Cambodian financial institutions with a large share of foreign ownership is not always better 
than banks owned domestically. Our finding in this paper may provide an explanation that the 
disadvantages of foreign funding sources, such as large volatility, are large in the case of 
Cambodia. Therefore, diversifying ownership structures and committing to collect domestic 
funds could improve the entire performance of the banking sector.   
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The rest of the present paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the Cambodian 
banking sector and recent situation of foreign funding. Section 3 presents our data and empirical 
strategy, and Section 4 presents the results of empirical analyses. Section 5 concludes.   
 
2. Overview of the Cambodian Banking Sector 
In this section, we describe the institutional background of the Cambodian banking sector. After 
prolonged civil war ended in 1999, Cambodia experienced high economic growth, with an 
average of 8.3% of GDP growth over the last 15 years (Oudom, 2016). This recent high growth 
rate has attracted large amounts of capital inflows. Cambodia is a highly open economy, and the 
Cambodian government has adopted a liberal stance toward the foreign investment and trade, 
leading to huge capital inflows (Hill & Menon, 2014). Most of capital inflows are in the form of 
official development assistance (ODA), foreign direct investment (FDI), and banking and 
monetary market (BMM). As argued by previous studies, bank lending flows are most unstable 
and subject to sudden stoppages (de Brouwer, 1999; Becker & Noone, 2009). Thus, a high 
dependency on foreign funding as a result of borrowing or deposits is likely to make the entire 
economy vulnerable to external shocks. In the case of Cambodia, Oudom (2016) showed that the 
recent capital flow is volatile and its main driver is BMM.  
The banking sector plays a pivotal role in fund mobilization in Cambodia, since there is 
no other formal financial market functioning in the country: there is no bond market, and 
although a stock exchange market was opened in 2011, only five companies were listed as of 
2017. The Cambodian banking sector is composed of three types of financial institutions: 
commercial banks, specialized banks, and microfinance institutions. Commercial banks are 
allowed to provide all financial services, while the regulations governing them are most strict in 
terms of capital requirements and reserve requirements. Specialized banks can be engaged in 
only one type of financial service, such as settlement network or loan provision to the 
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agricultural sector. Microfinance institutions are aimed to provide financial services for the poor, 
with restrictions on the amount of each loan grant. Prudential regulations are less stringent for 
specialized banks and microfinance institutions than commercial banks. As of 2017, commercial 
banks dominate almost 85% of total assets in the Cambodian banking sector, while microfinance 
institutions compose the remaining 15% (Aiba & Lam, 2019). Specialized banks have less than 
1% of total assets in the entire banking sector. An important characteristic of the Cambodian 
banking sector is that there are no state-owned commercial banks, although there is one 
state-owned specialized bank. Thus, the credit supply is completely delegated to private entities. 
Flows of non-resident liabilities are more volatile than those from domestic sources. 
Figure 2 shows year-on-year changes in aggregated outstanding loans, resident deposit, and 
non-resident liabilities. Non-resident liabilities include non-resident deposits and wholesale 
borrowing from abroad. The data is constructed from individual bank balance sheet data which 
includes the breakdown of deposits, borrowing, and equity by resident and non-resident sources. 
We obtained this administrative data from the National Bank of Cambodia. The data is on a 
quarterly basis and covers the period from 2013Q1 to 2019Q2. In the case of Cambodia, the 
year-on-year changes in outstanding loans and resident deposits have been stable from 2014Q1 
to 2019Q2, except for the spike in changes in resident deposits in 2014Q3, which reflected the 
large deposit withdrawals in 2013Q3 due to increased political uncertainty after the national 
election in April 2013.6  Meanwhile, non-resident liabilities fluctuated more during the same 
period. In particular, non-resident liabilities became lower after 2016Q1, when the US federal 
fund rate started increasing. Those fluctuations in funding flows mean foreign funding sources 
might be unstable compared to domestic funding sources, and could be a source of vulnerability 
in the banking sector. 
                                            
6 Ten percent of total deposits were withdrawn in August 2013, although most of that money returned to 
the banking sector in a few months. Even though the ruling party won the majority of seats, the number 
of seats and votes for the opposition party came close to those of the ruling party. After the election, 
there were rumors about frauds in voting during the election, and the opposition party boycotted the 
national assembly for one year. That political uncertainty led to the negative growth of domestic 
deposits in the third quarter of 2013. 
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Figure 2: Growth of Loans and Funding of the Cambodian Banks 
 
Source: National Bank of Cambodia, and authors’ calculation. Log. growth 
rate of each variable is calculated as year-on-year changes.   
 
Figure 3 shows the composition of liabilities by funding sources in Panel A. Shares of 
non-resident liabilities fluctuate 10%-15% over the period, while about 60% of funds in the 
Cambodian banking sector are comprised of domestic residents’ deposits. Non-resident 
liabilities (the sum of wholesale funding from abroad and non-resident deposits) in the banking 
sectors have been large and comparable to domestic wholesale funding over the period, meaning 
that foreign funding is one important funding source for the Cambodian banking sector. 
Non-resident liabilities in the Cambodian banking sector are large even compared to other 
countries. Panel B in Figure 3 provides a cross-country comparison of the ratio of non-resident 
liabilities to GDP across neighboring countries. It shows that the ratio of non-resident liabilities 
to GDP in Cambodia is higher than in other neighboring ASEAN countries.  
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Figure 3: Non-Resident Liabilities in the Cambodian Banking Sector 
Panel A: Composition of liabilities by funding 
sources 
Source: National Bank of Cambodia, and authors’ 
calculation. Non-resident liabilities are the sum of 
wholesale funding from abroad and non-resident 
deposits. 
Panel B: Cross-country comparison of 
non-resident liabilities to GDP 
Source: International Financial Statistics.For the 
calculation, we used non-resident liabilities as of 
2017Q4 and annual GDP as of 2017.   
The figure also shows that a substantial share of deposits in the banking sector are 
denominated in foreign currency. However, gross official reserves only cover 57% of foreign 
currency deposits, which severely limits the capacity of the central bank as the lender of last 
resort (IMF, 2018). In addition to this limitation, the country lacks deposit insurance, both of 
which  might lead to a high liquidity buffer in banks. 
3. Data and Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data 
To examine the effect of international transmission of monetary policy on banks’ domestic 
lending, we use detailed information on banks’ lending behavior and capital inflows into 
individual banks. The dataset used in the analysis is composed mainly from three data sources. 
The first one is the data of loan disbursements, which is quarterly aggregated data capturing the 
amounts of newly disbursed loans at the bank-level. We can observe buckets of loan disbarments 
in detail by loan segments such as currency, maturity, sector, and collateral requirements for each 
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bank. Specifically, there are total of 16 loan segments, based on currency (USD or local 
currency), sector (business or consumer loans), maturity (long-term or short-term), and security 
(secured or unsecured); the amounts of loan disbursements are aggregated by each of 16 
segments. The data tell us the amounts of loan disbursement at the aggregated level of each loan 
characteristic. For example, the amounts of disbursements of unsecured, long-term, USD 
denominated loans for business sector by bank i are available for each quarter. The second data 
source are banks’ balance sheets in the period from 2013Q1 to 2019Q2.7  This data allows us to 
investigate the non-resident liabilities and its components, and other bank characteristics, such 
as capital ratio, liquidity ratios, and total assets. The third data source is International Financial 
Statistics, from which we constructed the indicators of monetary policy rate of US federal funds 
and other foreign countries. The detailed definitions of variables used in estimation are available 
in Appendix Table 1.  
According to our data, after the US monetary policy rate increased, the trend in lending 
among Cambodian banks depended on whether banks were reliant on foreign funding. In Figure 
4, we compare the trend of loan disbursements between banks with and without foreign funding 
exposure. By using polynomial regression, we illustrate the trends of loan disbursement for 
banks with non-resident liabilities (NRL>0) and banks without non-resident liabilities (NRL=0) 
in Panel A, and banks with other foreign liabilities (OFL>0) and banks without other foreign 
liabilities (OFL=0) in Panel B. Other foreign liabilities are calculated as non-resident liabilities 
minus non-resident deposits, and may represent funding from other banks or companies 
including wholesale borrowing and deposits from foreign banks. Both figures show that the 
trends in amounts of loan disbursements are similar before the increase in US monetary policy in 
2015Q4. However, the amounts of loan disbursements increased among banks without foreign 
funding exposures, while there is neither an increasing trend in Panel A or a decreasing trend in 
                                            
7 The data of aggregated loan disbursements and balance sheets is provided by National Bank of 
Cambodia under the project “Empirical Study on Promotion of Home Currency in Cambodia”, which is 
joint research project of NBC and JICA Research Institute. 
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Panel B for banks with foreign funding exposure. It suggests that US monetary policy affected 
domestic bank lending in Cambodia, channeled through the dependency on foreign funding. In 
the next subsection, we propose the methodology to statistically examine this hypothesis.    
Figure 4: Trends of Loan Disbursements 
Panel A: Banks with and without non-resident 
liabilities 
Note: The figure shows the fitted line by polynomial 
regression for amounts of loan disbursement of 
banks with non-resident liabilities (NRL>0) and 
banks without non-resident liabilities (NRL=0). 
Panel B: Banks with and without other foreign 
liabilities 
Note: The figure shows the fitted line by 
polynomial regression for amounts of loan 
disbursement of banks with other foreign 
liabilities (OFL>0) and banks without other 
foreign liabilities (OFL=0). 
Source: Author’s calculations using data of loan disbursements and balance sheets of Cambodian 
commercial banks provided by National Bank of Cambodia. 
3.2 Empirical Model and Identification 
In creating the empirical model, we exploit detailed information on banks’ newly disbursed 
loans and balance sheets on a quarterly basis. Built on Jimenez et al. (2014), Buch et al. (2018) 
and Temesvary (2018), the model was constructed with lagged variables. We then identified the 
transmission of US monetary policy on banks’ domestic lending by examining the heterogeneity 
in the effect across different levels of exposures to foreign monetary policy. Specifically, we 
estimate the following equation:   
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𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡�= 𝛼𝛼 + Σ𝑘𝑘=03 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 + Σ𝑘𝑘=03 𝛽𝛽2𝑘𝑘 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1
⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1+ Σ𝑘𝑘=03 𝛽𝛽4𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏 + 𝜓𝜓𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜓𝜓𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜓𝜓𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜓𝜓𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡+ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡  (1) 
 
where 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) represents the logarithm of the amount of newly disbursed loans for 
bank i in quarter t. The subscripts represent the following dimensions: s ∈(Unsecured loan, 
Secured loan),  c ∈ (USD loan or local currency loan), m ∈ (Long-term loan, Short-term loan), 
b ∈ (Business loan, Consumer loan), and subscript j represent the bank’s major shareholder’s 
country. We defined long-term loans as those with more than one year of maturity; we defined all 
other loans as short-term loans.  
For identification of the effect of monetary policy, we employ the 
difference-in-difference-in-difference estimation strategy. In the empirical model, we included 
two variables to identify the effect of US monetary policy through the channel of foreign funding. 
First, we estimate the difference in the correlation of US monetary policy to loan disbursement 
between banks with foreign funding exposure and banks without it. 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 is a treatment dummy to 
represent whether a bank has foreign funding exposure. The interaction term of treatment 
dummy and US monetary policy rate, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘, is supposed to capture the effect of US 
monetary policy through bank’s foreign exposure. Second, we estimate whether the effect varies 
across levels of exposure. 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 represents the measure of foreign funding exposure, with the 
triple-interaction of treatment dummy, foreign funding exposure and US monetary policy  𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅
𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘  intended to capture this effect. To examine the channels in detail, we 
look at two different measures of foreign funding exposure. First, we employ the ratio of 
non-resident liabilities to total liabilities as the measure of foreign funding exposure.8  Second, 
                                            
8 Non-resident liabilities includes wholesale funding from abroad, deposits from foreign banks, and 
non-resident deposits. 
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instead of the ratio of non-resident liabilities, we employ the ratio of other foreign liabilities to 
total liabilities. Other foreign liabilities are calculated as non-resident liabilities minus 
non-resident deposits, and may represent funding from other banks or companies including 
wholesale borrowing and deposits from foreign banks. Since banks are to a large extent reliant 
on wholesale borrowing when they access the international capital market, the reliance on 
wholesale borrowing could be more likely to transmit shocks from abroad. A four-quarter 
cumulative effect of US monetary policy transmission is estimated as 
Σ𝑘𝑘=0
3 𝜕𝜕
2 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 𝜕𝜕𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 = Σ𝑘𝑘=03 𝛽𝛽1+𝛴𝛴𝑘𝑘=03 𝛽𝛽2𝑘𝑘𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1.  9 
 
Following prior studies (Temesvary et al., 2018, Kneer & Raabe, 2019), we also include 
lagged bank characteristics as 𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−𝑡𝑡, such as capital ratio, liquidity ratios, and 
total assets, and white noise, 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. In addition, we control the bank-loan-characteristic-fixed 
effect  𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑃𝑃,𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏. Furthermore, by taking advantage of our data, we control for the factors specific 
to each loan characteristic. The data we use allow us to look at the breakdown of amounts of 
newly issued loans by currency, maturity, security, and sector on a quarterly basis. We include 
time-variant dummies for each loan characteristic (𝜓𝜓𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 ,𝜓𝜓𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡,𝜓𝜓𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 ,𝜓𝜓𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡),  in order to absorb 
temporal increases in demand or supply in certain types of loans in each period, such as temporal 
increases in demand for local currency due to tax payment or changes in other regulations.10       
We also control FDI inflows from each bank’s major shareholders’ country into 
Cambodia (𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 ), which are likely to affect the banks’ lending behavior (Peek & 
Rosengren, 2000; Baskaya, 2017). FDIs could also affect the local demand for credit as FDI 
could be financed by the related banks. This potential mechanism of credit growth might affect 
our results as reverse causality. We include the FDI flows to control this channel of bank lending 
from foreign countries’ economic conditions. The data on FDI inflows is provided by the 
                                            
9 By definition, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘  equals 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘. 
10 The National Bank of Cambodia announced a new regulation in effect as of December 2019 that 
requires banks to keep 10% of outstanding loans outstanding in local currency. 
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Council of Development in Cambodia, and covers the amount of newly implemented FDIs by 
country for every quarter from 2013Q1 to 2019Q2.  
There might be other channels of international transmission in dollarized economies, 
such as domestic foreign currency deposits as Mora (2013) demonstrated in the examination of 
US monetary policy transmission through the foreign currency deposits in Mexico. However, 
the interest rates on domestic USD deposits have been stable even after the US federal fund rate 
started increasing in 2015Q4. Figure 5 shows the average interest rates of banks by maturities. 
This figure shows that interest rates on domestic USD deposits have not changed significantly 
after the US federal fund rate increased. Presumably, this is due to the high degree of 
dollarization in Cambodia. Banks can collect USD deposits from residents, and the interest rate 
on deposits are mostly determined by domestic factors.11  Figure 1 and Figure 5 may indicate 
that changes in US monetary policy have affected only the cost of funding from abroad for 
Cambodian banks. Thus, the effect could be larger if banks are more dependent on foreign 
funding, since Cambodian commercial banks could collect USD deposits from domestic 
customers at a stable funding cost. Thus, the interactions of treatment dummy, US federal fund 
rate and foreign funding exposure (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘) would capture the heterogeneity 
in the effect of US monetary policy change on the cost of non-resident liabilities into Cambodian 
banks. If the channel of non-resident liabilities plays a role in transmitting US monetary policy 
to banks’ domestic lending, we expect Σ𝑘𝑘=1𝑙𝑙 𝛽𝛽1𝑘𝑘 < 0, and Σ𝑘𝑘=1𝑙𝑙 𝛽𝛽2𝑘𝑘 < 0, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
11 One of the other possible channels is FX deposits in banks, as previous studies suggested. However, 
FX deposits are mostly kept by residents, and as we show in Figure 4, the interest rate on FX deposits 
did not changed in response to US monetary policy. Thus, it is not likely that FX deposit channeled the 
US monetary policy in Cambodia. Indeed, we also estimated the model with interaction terms of FX 
deposits × US monetary policy, but the results are not consistent with the transmission hypothesis. 
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Figure 5: Average Interest Rates on USD Deposits of Cambodian Commercial Banks 
Source: Author’s calculations using monthly data of deposits of 
Cambodian commercial banks provided by National Bank of Cambodia. 
This figure shows average interest rates on USD deposits provided by 
Cambodian commercial banks from 2013m1 to 2019m6. Data source is 
National Bank of Cambodia, and authors’ calculation.  
We also examine which types of loans are likely to be affected by international monetary 
transmission.  To do so, we extend the empirical model to the following equation. 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� 
 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛴𝛴𝑘𝑘=03 𝛽𝛽1𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 + 𝛴𝛴𝑘𝑘=03 𝛽𝛽2𝑘𝑘  𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 +𝛴𝛴𝑘𝑘=03 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘
⋅ (𝛾𝛾1𝑘𝑘𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 + 𝛾𝛾2𝑘𝑘𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚 + 𝛾𝛾3𝑘𝑘𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐+ 𝛾𝛾4𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏) +𝛴𝛴𝑘𝑘=03 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘
⋅ (𝛿𝛿1𝑘𝑘𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑘𝑘𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚 + 𝛿𝛿 3𝑘𝑘𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐+ 𝛿𝛿 4𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏) +Σ𝑘𝑘=03 𝛽𝛽3𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 + Σ𝑘𝑘=03 𝛽𝛽4𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 + 𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃,𝑠𝑠,𝑃𝑃,𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏  + 𝜓𝜓𝑠𝑠,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜓𝜓𝑐𝑐,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜓𝜓𝑚𝑚,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜓𝜓𝑏𝑏,𝑡𝑡+ 𝑢𝑢𝑃𝑃,𝑠𝑠,𝑃𝑃,𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏,𝐵𝐵 
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 where 𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑢𝑢𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑠𝑠 , 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚 , 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹 𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐 , and 
𝐵𝐵𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑏𝑏 are dummies that stand for whether loans are secured or unsecured, more 
than one year mature or not, in USD or the local currency, and for the business or consumer 
sector. As shown by Jiménez et al. (2014), monetary policy could also affect the structure of loan 
portfolios in terms of risk profile. Thus, the monetary policy could differently affect the loan 
provision across characteristics of loans. In particular, secured loans and short-term loans are 
generally less risky for lenders. In addition, in Cambodia, the interest rates on USD loans are 
lower than on local loans. Thus, the USD loans are provided to lower risk profile borrowers 
generally. For retail loans, although the interest rates are not necessarily lower than corporate 
loans, but the size of loans are far smaller and banks mostly require collateral. Thus, retail loans 
could be lower risk than business loans for Cambodian banks. In addition, foreign funding is 
generally long-term and large, thus facilitating banks to extend loans to the business sector. We 
examine which loan characters are highly affected by the US and other foreign monetary policy 
using equation 2. 
3.3 Examination of Transmission of Monetary Policy from Other Foreign Countries  
We further examine whether other countries’ monetary policies affect Cambodian banks. In the 
same manner we treat the US monetary policy, we include and examine the effect of monetary 
policy of each bank’s major shareholders’ home country j at time 𝐵𝐵(𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡). The variable 
is not likely to be affected by Cambodia’s economic situation, as it has one of the smallest open 
economies, while the changes in foreign countries’ monetary conditions affect capital inflows to 
Cambodian banks. In the case that the majority of shareholders of a given bank are Cambodian, 
we set the other countries’ monetary policy rate (𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡) to zero. In addition, since the 
monetary policy rate highly varies across countries, we standardize 𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 by subtracting 
mean and dividing by standard errors of the monetary policy rates for each country. Avdjiev et al. 
(2018) empirically demonstrated that cross-border lending is affected by the monetary policy of 
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each of the lender’s, borrower’s and currency-issued country. Therefore, we conjecture that the 
monetary policy rate in parent bank’s locations is also an important factor to understand the 
transmission mechanism through non-resident liabilities.  
Table 1 shows breakdowns of ownerships of commercial banks in Cambodia. 
Ownership information is collected from the audited annual report of commercial banks or their 
websites. In addition, we define a home country of the bank as the country in which a 
shareholder with largest shares live. We find that the number of total banks has increased over 
the period, and majority of shareholders of most of entrants are foreigners. Most of origins of 
such foreign-owned banks are Asian countries: Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, Korea, and Japan. 
 
Table 1: Home Countries of Major Shareholders of the Cambodian Banks
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Australia 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Cambodia 6 6 6 6 7 7 9
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
China 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
France 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
India 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Japan 2 2 2 2 3 3 4
Korea 4 4 4 4 4 4 5
Laos 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Malaysia 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Singapore 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Taiwan 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Thailand 2 2 3 4 4 4 4
Vietnam 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Total 35 35 36 37 40 41 44  
Source: Data is collected from annual reports of financial institutions or their websites. 
We defined major shareholders as the largest shareholders of a bank. 
 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of variables used in the analysis. In the first row of Table 2, 
we presented mean values and standard errors of amounts of loan disbursements by currency 
(USD or local currency), sector (business or consumer loans), maturity (long-term or short-term), 
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and security (secured or unsecured). This table also shows another interesting feature of the 
Cambodian banking sector.12  The liquidity ratio, defined as liquid assets over total assets, is 
high in the Cambodian banking sector. Other studies have found the liquidity ratio is 0.22 on 
average in the Brazilian banks (North & Busch 2017), and liquid- asset-to-deposit ratio is 0.36 in 
Ugandan banks (Abuka et al., 2020).  Cambodia’s high liquidity ratio could be a consequence 
of the high extent of the country’s financial dollarization and political instability. As Delechat et 
al. (2012) have empirically shown that liquidity buffers are generally higher for banks in highly 
dollarized economies, because of lack of a lender’s last resort. In addition, the Cambodian 
banking sector is vulnerable to external shocks, such as political turbulence. In the past, there 
were large-scale deposit withdrawals in the Cambodian banking sector just after the national 
election 2013. Those potential risks possibly make the Cambodian banks raise high liquidity 
buffers to offset potential risks of future deposit withdrawals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
12 For the definition and correlation matrix of the variables, please see Appendix Table 1 and 2. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Estimation 
Mean Standard Errors Observations
 Amounts of Loan Disbursement (By Loan Characteristics)
Business 36,715           128,345            2,827               
Consumer 140,507         662,656            2,218               
Short-term 68,789           288,087            2,147               
Long Term 95,335           506,456            3,492               
Local Currency 35,127           186,500            836 
USD 93,948           466,042            4,803               
Unsecured 26,712           353,112            1,006               
Secured 96,203           473,219            4,039               
All Loans 82,346           452,645            5045
Growth of Amont of Loan Disbursement (Log.) 0.04 1.29 4,725
Ratio of Non-resident Liablities 0.15               0.18 954 
Capital Ratio 0.32               0.24 954 
Liquidity Ratio 0.34               0.15 915 
Log. Total Asset 13.95             1.25 954 
Total Assets 2,454,523      3,835,078.00    954 
Log. Growth of Non-Resident Liabilities 0.02               0.08 906 
Log. Growth of Resident Deposits 0.06               0.23 925 
Log. Growth of Equity 0.07               0.50 828 
Ratio of FX Deposit to Liabilities 0.44               0.25 953 
Ratio of Non-Resident Deposits 0.05               0.07 951 
Ratio of Other Foreign Liabilities 0.10 0.17 951
Monetary Policy in Country j -0.1567249 0.8600542 300
FDI Inflow into Cambodia from Country j 36.38813 48.0332 324
US Monetary Policy 0.7980769 0.8329743 26
Source: Author’s calculations using data of loan disbursements and balance sheets of Cambodian 
commercial banks provided by National Bank of Cambodia, data from financial statements of 
each commercial banks, and data from the International Financial Statistics. Unit is millions of 
KHR. Loan amounts mean the amounts of newly issued loans by quarters. Long-term loans are 
loans with more than one year of maturity, while short-term loans have less than one year of 
maturity. Growths of amounts of loan disbursements in Table 2 is a quarter-to-quarter change in 
log. of loan volume. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Transmission of US Monetary Policy  
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation. We run a regression with fixed-effect OLS 
estimation. In order to capture the effects over one year, our estimation model included 3 lags of 
each independent variable and its contemporaneous measure at k=0. The values in each column 
represent the cumulative values of estimated coefficients of all lagged and contemporaneous 
measure, and standard errors. For the calculation standard errors, we employed two-way 
clustered robust standard errors at the bank- and quarter- level, following Cameron and Miller 
(2016).  We present the results of the ratio of non-resident liabilities to total liabilities in 
columns 1-4, and the results of the ratio of other foreign liabilities to total liabilities in columns 
5-8. 
In columns 1 and 5, we estimated the model with an interaction term of treatment 
dummy and US monetary policy rate (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 ) to examine the difference in the 
response to an increase in US monetary policy rate between banks with and without exposure. 
We find that the coefficient of the interaction term was negative at 1% statistical significance in 
column 1 and at 5% statistical significance in column 4; this interaction term is also significant 
in the other specifications in the table. Both of the measures of exposure to foreign monetary 
policy showed that banks with exposure decreased their domestic lending compared to banks 
without exposure following the increase in US monetary policy, suggesting that banks that are 
dependent on foreign funding are affected by US monetary policy changes. The estimated 
coefficient indicates the large economic impact of US monetary policy on banks with higher 
dependency on foreign funding. Based on the estimation results in column 1 (column 5), a 1% 
increase in US monetary policy rate leads to 0.45% (0.48%) decrease in domestic lending of 
banks with exposure on average compared to banks without exposure. 
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In columns 2 and 6, we estimated the model including the triple-interaction term of 
treatment dummy, US monetary policy rate and exposure (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑍𝑍𝑃𝑃,𝐵𝐵−𝐵𝐵−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝐵𝐵−𝐵𝐵).13  We find 
that the interaction term of treatment dummy and US monetary policy rate (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘) is 
statistically significant, while the triple interaction term ( 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 ) is not 
statistically significant in column 2, although the sign of coefficient is in line with our prediction. 
However, as shown in column 5, the triple-interaction term is negative at 5% statistical 
significance, in line with our prediction.  
                                            
13 By definition, 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 equals 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘. 
Table 3: Estimation of Determinants of Newly Disbursed Loans 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) -0.452*** -0.385* -3.278*** -3.466*** -0.480** -0.362* -3.110*** -2.379***
(0.187) (0.198) (0.485) (0.608) (0.210) (0.199) (0.495) (0.768)
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) -0.498 -1.527 -1.310** -4.823*
(0.588) (2.658) (0.659) (2.615)
Ʃ Z (i, t-1) -0.583 -0.268 -0.584 -0.372 -0.848* -0.104 -0.850* -0.127
(0.594) (0.666) (0.586) (0.639) (0.480) (0.553) (0.468) (0.550)
Ʃ Liquidity Ratio (i, t-1) -0.695 -0.788 -0.750 -0.817 -0.581 -0.726 -0.634 -0.834
(0.894) (0.817) (0.916) (0.903) (0.874) (0.747) (0.894) (0.848)
Ʃ Capital Ratio (i, t-1) -0.264 -0.193 -0.045 -0.090 -0.607 -0.516 -0.364 -0.110
(0.764) (0.731) (0.838) (0.713) (0.712) (0.676) (0.786) (0.806)
Ʃ Log. Total Asset (j, t-1) 0.564*** 0.578*** 0.607*** 0.592*** 0.528*** 0.505 0.577*** 0.554***
(0.221) (0.214) (0.237) (0.219) (0.216) (0.206) (0.232) (0.221)
Ʃ Capital Inflow (j, t) -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
0.422 0.196 0.473 0.355
(0.294) (0.328) (0.349) (0.330)
2.375*** 2.661*** 2.109*** 1.572**
(0.467) (0.578) (0.575) (0.795)
0.802*** 0.902*** 0.883*** 0.863***
(0.209) (0.232) (0.202) (0.250)
-0.413* -0.242 -0.434* -0.350
(0.236) (0.212) (0.253) (0.274)
1.819 2.337
(1.646) (1.658)
1.282 1.946
(1.913) (1.944)
-1.579* -0.173
(0.925) (0.945)
-1.250* -0.264
(0.709) (0.727)
Time-Currency Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Sector Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Maturity Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time- Security Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-Sector-Currency-Maturity-Security Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -6.905 -7.136 -7.266 -6.961 -6.285 -5.958 -6.765 -6.507
(3.781) (3.680) (4.041) (3.714) (3.617) (3.440) (3.893) (3.642)
Number of Obseravations 4,176 4176 4176 4,176 4,119 4,119 4,119 4,119
R-squared 0.792     0.792 4176 0.794     0.794 0.796 0.795 0.798
Z: Ratio Non-Resident Liabilities  to Total 
Liabilities
Z: Ratio of Foreign Wholesale Borrowing to 
Total  Liabilities
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x Collateral Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x USD Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x Long-term Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x Business Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Collateral 
Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x USD Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Long-term 
Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Business 
Dummy 
Source: Author’s calculations using data of loan disbursements and balance sheets of Cambodian commercial 
banks provided by National Bank of Cambodia, data from financial statements of each commercial banks, and data 
from the International Financial Statistics. ***,**, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. The fixed-effect OLS estimation is used for each column. In order to capture the effects over one year, 
each model included 3 lags of each independent variables and its contemporaneous measure at k=0. The values in 
each column show the cumulative values of estimated coefficients of all lagged variables, and two-way clustered 
robust standard errors at the bank- and quarter- level are presented in parentheses. The sample period spans from 
2013Q1-2019Q2. Z(i, t-1) represent the measure of foreign funding exposure. In columns 1-4, the ratio of non-
resident liabilities to total liabilities are adopted as Z(i, t-1). In columns 5-8, the ratio of other liabilities to total 
liabilities are adopted as Z(i, t-1). I(t) represents the treatment dummy which takes one if Z(i, t-1) is not zero. US 
policy (t) represents the US federal fund rate, and FC Policy (t, j) represents the rate in each bank’s shareholders’ 
home countries.   
24 
 25 
 
Overall, the estimated coefficients are similar between the ratio of other foreign 
liabilities and the ratio of non-resident liabilities. In addition, the triple-interaction term of 
treatment dummy, US monetary policy rate and exposure (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑍𝑍𝑃𝑃,𝐵𝐵−𝐵𝐵−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝐵𝐵−𝐵𝐵) is estimated 
at statistical significance in the case of the ratio of other foreign liabilities. This might suggest 
that international monetary transmission is channeled via wholesale funding from abroad. 
Based on the estimation in column 5, the banks with a one-standard-deviation higher 
ratio of other foreign liabilities (0.17) would experience a 0.22% larger decline in lending to one 
loan segment than other banks with exposure, and a 0.58% decline compared to banks without 
exposure. We also illustrated the estimated impact of the US monetary policy rate in Figure 6, 
based on the result of column 6. As a response to an actual change in the US monetary policy rate, 
we calculated the cumulative effects of US monetary policy rate for banks with the average 
exposure (Z=0.10), the bank with one-standard-deviation higher exposure (Z=0.27), and banks 
with small exposure (Z=0.05), using the following formula:  
 
Σ𝑘𝑘=0
3 𝜕𝜕
2 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑐𝑐,𝑚𝑚,𝑏𝑏,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡�
𝜕𝜕𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘  𝜕𝜕𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 = (Σ𝑘𝑘=03 𝛽𝛽1+𝛴𝛴𝑘𝑘=03 𝛽𝛽2𝑘𝑘𝑍𝑍) ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 
 
Figure 6 shows that the US monetary policy rate decreased loan disbursements after 
2015Q4, with a severe negative effect on banks with higher exposure. When the US monetary 
policy rate rose to 2.25% in 2018Q4, the estimated impact amounted to around a 1% decline for 
the average banks (Z=0.10), and a greater than 1% decline for the bank with 
one-standard-deviation higher exposure (Z=0.27). Our results suggest that tightening of US 
monetary policy severely affects the domestic lending of banks with higher dependency on 
foreign funding. The results are consistent to prior studies of international monetary 
transmission in other emerging markets (Ongena et al., 2015).  
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Figure 6: Estimated Economic Impacts of US Monetary Policy 
Source: The figure illustrates the estimated impact of an increase in the 
US monetary policy rate, based on the estimated model shown in 
column 6 in Table 3. Each of the plotted line shows the estimated 
impact for banks of which the ratio of other foreign liabilities to total 
liabilities (Z) is 0.05, 0.10, 0.27.  
In columns 3-4 and 7-8, we presented the results of the estimation of equation 2, which 
include the triple-interactions of treatment dummy, US monetary policy rates, and loan 
characteristic dummies, and the quadruple-interactions of treatment dummy, measure of 
exposure to foreign monetary policy, US monetary policy rates, and loan characteristic 
dummies. 14   We find that there were distributional effects of US monetary policy across 
different characteristics of loans. First, we find that coefficients of the triple-interaction term of 
treatment dummy, US monetary policy rate, and USD currency dummy (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 ⋅
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐) showed a positive sign and a statistical significance in all specifications in Table 3, 
suggesting that lending in USD is less affected by changes in the cost of funding from abroad 
than local currency loans. Given that risk profiles of clients are different between loan currencies, 
the results also suggest that increases in funding costs facilitated asset allocations of banks 
14 We also checked the robustness in the different specifications of equation 2 in a step-wise manner. 
These results are presented in Appendix Table 3. 
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toward less risky assets, in line with Jiménez et al. (2014) and De Jonghe et al. (2020). 
Furthermore, the dummy for secured loans is also estimated as positive and significant. The 
result also supports the asset reallocation hypotheses in response to changes in funding costs.   
In the context of Cambodia, the results can be also interpreted as follows. Since 
collecting local currency deposits is costly in the sense that interest rates on local deposits are 
higher than USD deposits, the availability of cheaper foreign funds could affect lending in local 
currency. In fact, the National Bank of Cambodia started a currency swap operation “local 
currency collateralized provision operation” from 2016, which provides the local currency 
liquidity with banks in exchange for USD liquidity of banks as collateral. Thus, the increases in 
the funding cost from abroad decreases the lending in local currency, and instead increases USD 
lending.  
We also find that US monetary policy rate is associated with banks’ loan allocation 
across sectors. The interactions with the business loan dummy are estimated as negative and 
statistically significant in columns 3 and 7, meaning that increases in funding costs from abroad 
negatively affected the provision of domestic business loans. As a practice, Cambodian banks 
require collateral, such as land property, when they extend consumer loans. In the meantime, 
banks require financial statements and business plans for the provision of business loans. Thus, 
the results can be interpreted as banks reallocating loans from risky borrowers to safer ones.  
The triple-interactions of treatment dummy, US policy and long-term loans ( 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅
𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘) are estimated as positive at 1% statistical significance in columns 3-4 and 7-8. 
This suggests that the effects of US monetary policy increased the number of long-term loans in 
the overall loan composition and decreased short-term loans. The result is different from our 
prediction that the bank loans would shift toward less risky loans. Presumably, the results might 
imply that short-term loans are riskier than long-term loans in Cambodia. Indeed, most loans in 
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Cambodia are short-term, with borrowers in rural areas more likely to take out short-term loans 
because of the availability of collateralized assets.15   
Furthermore, the coefficient of the interactions of the treatment dummy and US 
monetary policy ( 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 ) is estimated higher overall in the model including 
distributional effects (columns 3-4, and 7-8), and the triple-interaction term of treatment dummy, 
US monetary policy rate and exposure (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑍𝑍𝑃𝑃,𝐵𝐵−𝐵𝐵−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝐵𝐵−𝐵𝐵) is also higher, particularly in 
column 8. In the estimated model of column 7, the estimated coefficient of the interaction of the 
treatment dummy and US monetary policy rate (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘) is -3.110. This means that 
banks with exposure experienced a -3.110% decrease on average in loan provision in response to 
a 1% increase of US monetary policy, compared to banks without exposure. Furthermore, in 
column 8, the triple-interaction term of the treatment dummy, US monetary policy rate and 
exposure (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑍𝑍𝑃𝑃,𝐵𝐵−𝐵𝐵−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝐵𝐵−𝐵𝐵) was estimated to be -4.123, meaning that the impact of US 
monetary policy increases as an exposure of foreign funding increases, and 
one-standard-deviation higher exposure (0.17)  additionally deceases loan provision on average 
by 0.701%.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
15 We checked the credit registry data from the Credit Bureau of Cambodia. The average maturity of all 
the newly disbursed loans from banks in 2016-2019 was 33 months for individual lending, which 
include business purposes, personal loans, mortgage loans, and credit card loans. 
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Figure 7: Estimated Economic Impact of US Monetary Policy (By Loan Characteristics) 
Source: The figure illustrates the estimated impact of an increase in US monetary policy rate, based on 
the estimated model showed in column 8 in Table 3. Each of the plotted line shows the estimated impact 
for banks of which the ratio of other foreign liabilities (Z) is 0.10. The secured, short-term, USD business 
loans are treated as baseline in each panel.    
Furthermore, in Figure 7, we illustrated the estimated impact of an increase in the US 
monetary policy rate across loan characteristics, based on the estimated model showed in 
column 8 in Table 3. Each of the plotted lines shows the estimated impact for banks of which the 
ratio of other foreign liabilities (Z) is 0.10. The secured, short-term, USD business loans are 
treated as baseline in each panel. The figure indicates that distributional effects across loan 
characteristics are large enough to change loan composition significantly for banks with 
exposure of foreign funding on average. Decreases in secured, short-term, USD business loans 
amounted to about 2% in 2019Q2, while decreases in secured, short-term, KHR business loans 
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amounted to about 8%. The secured, long-term, USD business loans were not negatively 
affected by US policy, and it rather increased 0.1-0.2% after the US monetary policy rate 
increased. Decreases in secured, short-term, USD consumer loans amounted to about 1%. The 
decreases in unsecured, short-term, USD business loans amounted to about 2.5% in 2019Q2. 
The results suggests that US monetary policy increases especially affected the currency and 
maturity compositions of bank loans in Cambodia. 
4.2 Transmission of Monetary Policy from Banks’ Major Shareholders’ Home Countries 
We further investigate the relationship between domestic bank lending and other foreign 
countries’ monetary policy. De Haas and Lelyveld (2006, 2010) empirically showed that 
economic and monetary shocks within the home countries of multinational banks affect the 
performance of local subsidiaries. Thus, aside from US monetary policy, other foreign countries’ 
monetary policies will transmit to Cambodia through as a result of its banks’ reliance on foreign 
funding. Here, we examine the hypothesis that the foreign monetary policy in the home countries 
of a bank’s major shareholders affect that bank’s lending in Cambodia. We also examine 
whether a home country’s monetary policy has a comparable impact with the US monetary 
policy for a developing country. To do so, we added the interaction terms of treatment dummy 
and other foreign country monetary policy (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  ⋅ 𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡 ) in the same manner as we 
included the US monetary policy rate in equation 1 and 2.   
We present the estimation results in Table 4. We ran a regression with fixed-effect OLS 
estimation. In order to capture the effects over one year, our estimation model included 3 lags of 
each independent variables and its contemporaneous measure at k=0. The values in each column 
show the cumulative values of the estimated coefficients of all lagged and contemporaneous 
measures and standard errors. For the calculation standard errors, we employed two-way 
clustered robust standard errors at the bank- and quarter- level, following Cameron and Miller 
(2016).  We present the results of the ratio of non-resident liabilities to total liabilities in 
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columns 1-4, and the results of the ratio of other foreign liabilities to total liabilities in columns 
5-8. 
The estimated results in columns 1 and 5 reveals that the coefficient of the 
triple-interactions of the treatment dummy, exposure and monetary policy of majority 
shareholders’ home countries (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 ⋅ 𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵ℎ𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵 𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝐵𝐵𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝑙𝑙 𝑀𝑀𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘) is not statistically significant, 
indicating the ratio of non-resident liabilities is not working to channel the monetary policy 
effects in other foreign countries. In the meantime, the effect of US monetary policy is still 
estimated as negative at statistical significance in both columns 1 and 4.   
In columns 2 and 6, we included the triple- and the quadruple-interaction of the 
treatment dummy, exposure, monetary policy, and loan characteristic dummies, in order to 
capture the distributional effect of foreign monetary policy across different types of loans. In 
columns 3 and 6, we included country-period fixed effects to take into account the time-variant 
effect relating to the shareholders’ home country for the robustness check of our results. Even 
though we include the capital inflows from shareholders’ countries, there could still be omitted 
variable biases, such as changes in trade volumes and other macroeconomic variables within the 
countries. As a result, we find that statistical significance becomes smaller overall in coefficients 
relating to US monetary policy and monetary policy in shareholders’ home countries in the 
model with the ratio of non-resident liabilities as the proxy of exposure. However, the model 
with the ratio of other foreign liabilities as the proxy of exposure shows a robust result even 
when we include the county-period fixed effect (column 7). 
The significance of other foreign monetary policy is weak in most relevant variables. In 
columns 4 and 8, we only included the interactions of treatment dummies and other foreign 
monetary policy. However, we find that the interaction of treatment dummies, exposure and 
other foreign monetary policy ( 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 ⋅ 𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 ) is negative at 10% statistical 
significance in column 8, and the significance disappears once US monetary policy variables are 
included in other specifications. In column 2, the quadruple-interaction with a long-term loan 
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dummy (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 ⋅ 𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 ⋅ 𝐿𝐿𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐵𝐵𝑚𝑚 𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐) is positive but statistically significant 
at 10% level. In columns 6, 7, 8, we find that the triple-interaction with USD loan dummy (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅
𝑂𝑂𝐹𝐹 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦𝑐𝑐 ) is positive at 5%, 10%, and 1% statistical significance, 
respectively. However, the point estimation of this coefficient was weaker than the one for US 
monetary policy. Therefore, overall, there is no strong evidence on the effect of monetary policy 
of majority shareholders’ home countries across different specifications in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Determinants of Newly Disbursed Loans with Other Foreign Monetary Policy 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) -0.549 -3.626*** -5.131*** -0.597 -2.882*** -4.066***
(0.384) (0.845) (1.557) (0.382) (0.812) (1.428)
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) -0.703 -2.554 -3.519 -1.653** -8.208*** -7.467***
(0.685) (4.021) (3.669) (0.737) (2.309) (2.326)
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) -0.028 -0.235 0.170 -0.544 0.046 0.023 -0.143 -0.843
(0.264) (0.610) (0.816) (0.734) (0.258) (0.237) (0.677) (0.659)
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) -0.193 -0.479 -2.270 -4.187 -0.037 -0.104 -2.633 -4.417*
(0.688) (3.791) (3.599) (3.135) (0.449) (2.384) (2.751) (2.676)
Ʃ Z (i, t-1) -0.490 -0.629 -1.209 -1.762 -0.053 -0.062 -1.599** -2.300***
(0.617) (0.579) (0.771) (0.728) (0.445) (0.521) (0.725) (0.844)
Ʃ Liquidity Ratio (i, t-1) -0.336 -0.371 -0.972 -1.399 -0.306 -0.640 -0.547 -1.025
(0.933) (0.960) (1.177) (1.105) (0.840) (0.897) (1.140) (1.126)
Ʃ Capital Ratio (i, t-1) -0.451 -0.283 0.663 -0.119 -0.656 -0.319 -0.482 -0.823
(0.696) (0.842) (1.699) (1.304) (0.662) (0.817) (1.719) (1.367)
Ʃ Log. Total Asset (j, t-1) 0.441* 0.590** 1.017** 0.606 0.359 0.546** 0.790 0.619*
(0.237) (0.288) (0.520) (0.387) (0.225) (0.267) (0.496) (0.361)
Ʃ OF Policy (j, t) -0.003 -0.002 0.001 0.000
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ʃ FDI Inflow (j, t) -0.019 0.049 -0.086 0.035
(0.210) (0.063) (0.230) (0.070)
0.404 -0.839 0.617** -0.500
(0.270) (1.161) (0.284) (1.171)
2.507*** 3.551*** 1.694* 2.346*
(0.893) (1.420) (0.930) (1.402)
0.750*** 0.874*** 0.695** 0.868***
(0.301) (0.289) (0.323) (0.321)
-0.182 0.140 -0.219 0.082
(0.281) (0.298) (0.343) (0.319)
1.685 2.125 2.920** 2.670*
(1.563) (1.825) (1.447) (1.623)
2.676 1.965 4.982*** 4.844**
(3.559) (3.151) (2.049) (2.248)
-1.896** -1.675 -0.581 -0.824
(0.982) (1.035) (1.148) (1.190)
-1.509 -1.714* -0.466 -0.781
(0.978) (1.016) (0.939) (0.960)
-0.338 -0.385 -0.358 -0.484 -0.424 -0.459
(0.380) (0.398) (0.358) (0.327) (0.344) (0.336)
0.546 0.349 -0.034 0.381** 0.402* 0.587***
(0.602) (0.529) (0.392) (0.182) (0.213) (0.218)
-0.109 -0.070 0.113 0.059 0.122 0.119
(0.266) (0.299) (0.236) (0.224) (0.249) (0.243)
-0.031 -0.122 0.033 -0.147 -0.198 -0.197
(0.291) (0.303) (0.228) (0.226) (0.234) (0.232)
0.625 0.553 0.782 -0.027 0.112 0.152
(1.683) (1.636) (1.393) (1.390) (1.342) (1.393)
-0.784 1.023 2.551 0.075 1.550 0.921
(2.915) (2.702) (2.552) (1.830) (2.015) (2.100)
1.434* 1.427 0.948 0.716 0.730 0.761
(0.801) (0.886) (0.855) (0.788) (0.849) (0.844)
-0.732 -0.461 -0.699 -0.616 -0.457 -0.489
(0.881) (0.946) (0.885) (0.763) (0.825) (0.821)
Z: Ratio of Foreign Wholesale Borrowing to 
Total  Liabilities
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x Collateral Dummy 
Z: Ratio Non-Resident Liabilities  to Total 
Liabilities
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) x Long-term 
Dummy
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) x USD Dummy
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) x Collateral 
Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) x Business Dummy
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x USD Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) x Long-term Dummy
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x Business Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Collateral 
Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x USD Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Long-term 
Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Business Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) x Collateral Dummy
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x Long-term Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) x USD Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) x Business Dummy 
 
Table 4: Determinants of Newly Disbursed Loans with Other Foreign Monetary Policy (Cont.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Time-Currency Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Sector Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Maturity Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time- Security Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County-Period Fixed Effect No No Yes Yes No No No Yes
Bank-Sector-Currency-Maturity-Security Fixed Effec Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -4.996 -7.084 -13.795 -9.541 -3.655 -6.255 -10.156 -9.514
(4.111) (4.980) (8.653) (6.647) (3.751) (4.534) (8.257) (6.296)
Number of Obseravations 3,959 3,959 3,959 3,959 3,902 3,902 3,902 3,902
R-squared 0.792 0.797 0.803 0.799 0.796 0.802 0.807 0.803
Z: Ratio of Foreign Wholesale Borrowing to 
Total  Liabilities
Z: Ratio Non-Resident Liabilities  to Total 
Liabilities
Source: Author’s calculations using data of loan disbursements and balance sheets of Cambodian 
commercial banks provided by National Bank of Cambodia, data from financial statements of each 
commercial banks, and data from the International Financial Statistics. ***,**, and * represent statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The fixed-effect OLS estimation is used for each column. 
In order to capture the effects over one year, each model included 3 lags of each independent variable 
and its contemporaneous measure at k=0. The values in each column show the cumulative values of 
estimated coefficients of all lagged variable, and two-way clustered robust standard errors at the bank- 
and quarter-level are presented in parentheses. The sample period spanned from 2013Q1-2019Q2. Z(i, 
t-1) represent the measure of foreign funding exposure. In columns 1-3, the ratio of non-resident 
liabilities to total liabilities are adopted as Z(i, t-1). In columns 4-6, the ratio of other liabilities to total 
liabilities are adopted as Z(i, t-1). I(t) represents the treatment dummy which takes one if Z(i, t-1) is not 
zero. US policy (t) represents the US federal fund rate, and FC Policy (t, j) represents the monetary 
policy rate in banks’ shareholders’ home countries.
4.3 Robustness Check 
We further examine the robustness with regard to other possible channels of transmission of 
foreign monetary policy. Prior studies have examined the effect of monetary transmission using 
the interactions of the monetary policy rate with the capital ratio and liquidity ratio (Peek & 
Rosengren, 2000; Baskaya, 2017; Temesvary et al., 2018). Following these studies, we include 
the interaction terms between monetary policy stance rate in the US and other foreign countries 
and 𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵 𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 as follows. Banks with liquidity constraints are likely to be affected by 
increases in the cost of funding. Thus, the interaction between the liquidity ratio and US 
monetary policy rate will be estimated to be positive. Likewise, since less capitalized banks are 
likely to be affected by the increase in the cost of funding, the interaction between the capital 
ratio and US monetary policy rate will also be estimated to be positive. If there is heterogeneity 
in the effects of foreign monetary policy across different levels of liquidity ratios and 
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capitalization, interaction terms between these variables and monetary policy will be estimated 
as positive at statistical significance. 
In Table 5, we estimated the other specifications. Likewise, we run a regression with a 
fixed-effect OLS estimation. In order to capture the effects over one year, each model included 3 
lags of each independent variable and its contemporaneous measure at k=0. The two-way 
clustered robust standard errors both at the bank- and quarter-level are applied in the estimation. 
The cumulative effects of the all lagged variables are presented in the table.   
In columns 1 and 5, we estimated the model including US monetary policy transmission 
with potential channels of liquidity ratio and capitalization. In columns 2 and 6, we estimated the 
model including both US and other foreign monetary policy transmission with the potential 
channels of liquidity ratio and capitalization. We find that the results relevant to the exposure to 
foreign funding and US monetary policy (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 and 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘) did 
not change from Table 3 and Table 4. Thus, we find the robust result that US monetary policy 
transmitted through the foreign funding channel. 
In the meantime, the coefficients of liquidity ratio and capitalization measures are 
estimated in opposite signs that we predicted in columns 1 and 2, and it was not even statistical 
significant in columns 4 and 5. The results suggest that bank capitalization and a liquidity buffer 
do not necessarily mitigate the impact of changes in the cost of foreign funding on bank 
domestic lending.   
In columns 3 and 7, we examined the models without Cambodian-owned banks. In 
columns 4 and 8, we estimated the models with the Cambodian ownership dummy to examine 
the difference in the effect of US monetary policy between Cambodian-owned banks (6 banks) 
and foreign-owned banks. Firstly, when we exclude the Cambodian banks from the sample 
(columns 3 and 7), the statistical significance disappears in the variable relevant to US monetary 
policy transmission. It suggests that Cambodian-owned banks might have driven the results in 
previous estimation, or that the reduction in the sample size contributed to the insignificance in 
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the results. In fact, since some of Cambodian-owned banks also have a large extent of exposure 
to foreign funding, and Cambodian-owned banks existed throughout the period of our analysis, 
the exclusion of these banks did lead to a large reduction in sample size.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Robustness Checks with Other Specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) -0.819** -0.451 0.036 -0.613** -0.547* -0.529 0.085 -0.567**
(0.387) (0.408) (0.507) (0.260) (0.311) (0.444) (0.431) (0.263)
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) -0.811 -1.040** 0.199 0.110 -1.428** -1.584*** -0.566 -0.703
(0.548) (0.513) (0.542) (0.527) (0.683) (0.651) (0.616) (0.599)
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) -0.338 -0.379 0.057 -0.175 -0.400 0.038
(0.208) (0.449) (0.181) (0.217) (0.380) (0.143)
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) -0.019 -0.329 -0.459 0.085 -0.175 -0.288
(0.637) (0.733) (0.679) (0.493) (0.522) (0.478)
Ʃ Z (i, t-1) -6.183 -0.441 -0.461 -0.601 -0.184 -0.123 -0.082 -0.199
(5.689) (0.511) (0.747) (0.647) (0.536) (0.458) (0.601) (0.514)
Ʃ Liquidity Ratio (i, t-1) -0.914 -0.277 -0.574 -0.396 -0.955 -0.671 -0.761 -0.403
(0.869) (0.979) (1.152) (0.914) (0.741) (0.871) (0.933) (0.817)
Ʃ Capital Ratio (i, t-1) -0.583 -0.833 -1.318** -0.454 -0.888 -0.837 -1.305* -0.735
(0.863) (0.914) (0.586) (0.653) (0.776) (0.925) (0.702) (0.620)
Ʃ Log. Total Asset (j, t-1) 0.543* 0.431 0.157 0.370 0.414 0.388 0.092 0.210
(0.298) (0.313) (0.236) (0.235) (0.278) (0.310) (0.239) (0.233)
Ʃ OF Policy (j, t) -0.030 0.001 0.418 -0.010 -0.009 -0.003 0.443 -0.005
(0.055) (0.064) (0.347) (0.062) (0.059) (0.065) (0.311) (0.070)
Ʃ FDI Inflow (j, t) -0.003 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Ʃ Liquidity Ratio (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) -0.910*** -1.286*** -0.243 -0.432 -8.748***
(0.321) (0.291) (0.355) (0.424) (0.960)
Ʃ Capital Ratio (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) -0.298 -0.819 -0.074 -0.767 0.483***
(0.302) (0.524) (0.269) (0.630) (0.192)
Ʃ Liquidity Ratio (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) 0.395 -0.078
(0.538) (0.608)
Ʃ Liquidity Ratio (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) 0.532 0.596
(0.390) (0.499)
Ʃ  I (i) x US Policy (t) x Cambodia Dummy 0.704*** 0.483***
(0.243) (0.192)
Ʃ  Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Cambodia Dummy -8.632*** -8.748***
(1.849) (0.960)
Time-Currency Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Sector Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Maturity Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time- Security Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-Sector-Currency-Maturity-Security Fixed Effe Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -6.386 -6.737 0.158 -3.779 -4.349 -3.969 1.244 -1.144
(5.089) (5.458) (3.644) (3.990) (4.710) (5.182) (3.481) (3.764)
Number of Obseravations 3,959 3,959 2,878 3,959 3,902 3,902 2,821 3,902
R-squared 0.793     0.794 0.750 0.796 0.797 0.797 0.754 0.801
Z: Ratio of Foreign Wholesale Borrowing to 
Total  Liabilities
Z: Ratio Non-Resident Liabilities  to 
Total Liabilities
Source: Author’s calculations using data of loan disbursements and balance sheets of Cambodian commercial banks provided 
by National Bank of Cambodia, data from financial statements of each commercial banks, and data from the International 
Financial Statistics. ***,**, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The fixed-effect OLS 
estimation is used for each column. In order to capture the effects over one year, each model included 3 lags of each 
independent variables and its contemporaneous measure at k=0. The values in each column show the cumulative values of 
estimated coefficients of all lagged variables, and two-way clustered robust standard errors at the bank- and quarter-level are 
presented in parentheses. The sample period spanned from 2013Q1-2019Q2. Z(i, t-1) represent the measure of foreign funding 
exposure. In columns 1-4, the ratio of non-resident liabilities to total liabilities are adopted as Z(i, t-1). In columns 5-8, the 
ratio of other liabilities to total liabilities are adopted as Z(i, t-1). I(t) represents the treatment dummy which takes one if Z(i, t-1) 
is not zero. US policy (t) represents the US federal fund rate, and FC Policy (t, j) represents the monetary policy rate in banks’ 
shareholders’ home countries.   
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Secondly, when we include the interaction terms of Cambodian ownership dummy with 
variables relevant to US monetary policy transmission (columns 4 and 8), we find that the 
statistical significance in the interaction terms of the treatment dummy and US monetary policy 
𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 remains, meaning that the effect of monetary policy transmission is still found 
in non-Cambodian-owned banks. In the meantime, the quadruple-interaction with the 
Cambodian-ownership dummy (𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ⋅ Zi,t−k−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 ⋅ 𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑏𝑏𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑦) is estimated as 
negative at 1% statistical significance in both columns 4 and 8. This suggests that the 
Cambodian owned banks have a more severe negative impact from the increase in US monetary 
policy compared to the foreign-owned banks with the same level of exposure to foreign funding. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the coefficient is -8.563 in column 4 and -10.482 in column 8, 
suggesting that the Cambodian-owned banks with a higher dependency on foreign funding 
decreased the provision of loans by approximately -8.563% (-10.482%) more than 
foreign-owned banks with the same level of dependency on foreign funding when the US 
monetary policy rate changed by 1%. Our analysis revealed that banks with Cambodian 
ownership and a higher dependence on foreign funding are particularly prone to a decline in 
lending when the cost of foreign funding increases. Presumably, the results imply that local 
banks have a disadvantage in access to the capital market, which is particularly serious when US 
monetary policy tightens.  
In Table 6 and Table 7, we further carried out additional robustness checks. Specifically, 
we replaced measures of foreign funding exposure for other potential channels of international 
monetary transmission. In columns 1-4, we included the ratio of non-resident deposits to total 
liabilities. In columns 5-8, we included the ratio of FX deposits to total liabilities. Likewise, we 
run a regression with fixed-effect OLS estimation for each specification, and each model 
included 3 lags of each independent variable and its contemporaneous measure at k=0. Two-way 
clustered robust standard errors at the bank- and quarter-level are applied in the estimation. The 
cumulative effects of all the lagged variables are presented in the table.   
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Regarding the ratio of non-resident deposits to total liabilities, the coefficients of 
interaction with US monetary policy are not significant in column 5 or 6. Although it is 
statistically significant, the coefficient  is estimated in the opposite directions in columns 7 and 
8. Even when we look at the distributional effects of US monetary policy and other foreign 
monetary policy in loan characteristics, the estimated coefficients are mostly not significant. 
Again, although it is significant, the signs of the coefficients are opposite from the results of 
non-resident liabilities and other foreign liabilities in Table 4. Those results might suggest that 
international monetary transmission is likely to be channeled through wholesale funding from 
abroad rather than non-resident deposits. However, given that the coefficients relevant to US 
monetary policy were in a different direction from other foreign liabilities, the results might 
imply that non-resident deposits could work to buffer the effect of US monetary policy changes. 
Lastly, we examine the channel of FX deposits. In the Cambodia, about 80% of FX 
deposits are denominated in USD. Mora (2013) empirically documented that FX deposits were a 
channel of US monetary policy into Mexico by testing the interaction terms of the ratio of USD 
deposit and US monetary policy. However, in Tables 6 and 7, we find that the coefficients of 
interactions of the ratio of FX deposits to total liabilities and US monetary policy are not 
estimated with statistical significance overall in all the columns.   
All in all, our findings suggest that the international monetary transmission is likely to 
be channeled through wholesale funding from abroad rather than non-resident deposits or FX 
deposits. In other words, the effect of US monetary policy is likely to be transmitted from parent 
banks or associated banks in foreign countries. 
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Table 6: Robustness Check with Other Variables of Channel of Internal Monetary Transmission 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) -0.257 -0.117
(0.263) (0.516)
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) 0.814 11.268** -0.045 0.642
(1.392) (5.176) (0.303) (1.131)
Ʃ Z (i, t-1) 0.254 0.304 -0.150 -0.015
(1.124) (1.146) (0.648) (0.599)
Ʃ Liquidity Ratio (i, t-1) -0.717 -0.739 -0.788 -0.803
(0.859) (0.890) (0.881) (0.880)
Ʃ Capital Ratio (i, t-1) -0.397 -0.076 -0.499 -0.369
(0.753) (0.799) (0.976) (0.963)
Ʃ Log. Total Asset (j, t-1) 0.453** 0.508*** 0.371 0.373*
(0.194) (0.182) (0.225) (0.203)
Ʃ FDI Inflow (j, t) -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
0.667
(0.413)
-1.041**
(0.417)
0.627**
(0.244)
0.047
(0.247)
0.293 -0.556
(3.060) (0.963)
-8.930** -0.301
(4.135) (0.754)
-3.64388 -0.233
(1.928) (0.660)
1.276 0.536
(2.505) (0.686)
Time-Currency Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Sector Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Maturity Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time- Security Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-Sector-Currency-Maturity-Security Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -5.182 -6.138 -3.833 -4.024
(3.280) (2.981) (4.042) (3.684)
Number of Obseravations 4,119 4,119 4,139 4,139
R-squared 0.794 0.797 0.793 0.794
Ʃ I (i) x US MP (t) x Business Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Collateral Dummy 
Z: Ratio of Non-Resident 
Deposit to Liabilities
Z: Ratio of FX Deposit 
to Liabilities
Ʃ I (i) x US MP (t) x Collateral Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x US MP (t) x USD Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x US MP (t) x Long-term Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x USD Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Long-term Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Business Dummy 
Source: Author’s calculations using data of loan disbursements and balance sheets of Cambodian commercial banks 
provided by National Bank of Cambodia, data from financial statements of each commercial banks, and data from the 
International Financial Statistics. ***,**, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The 
fixed-effect OLS estimation is used for each column. In order to capture the effects over one year, each model included 3 
lags of each independent variable and its contemporaneous measure at k=0. The values in each column show the 
cumulative values of estimated coefficients of all lagged variable, and two-way clustered robust standard errors at the 
bank- and quarter-level are presented in parentheses. The sample period is spanned from 2013Q1-2019Q2. Z(i, t-1) 
represent the measure of foreign funding exposure. In columns 1-4, the ratio of non-resident deposits to total liabilities are 
adopted as Z(i, t-1). In columns 5-8, the ratio of FX deposits to total liabilities are adopted as Z(i, t-1). I(t) represents the 
treatment dummy which takes one if Z(i, t-1) is not zero. US policy (t) represents the US federal fund rate, and FC Policy 
(t, j) represents the monetary policy rate in banks’ shareholders’ home countries.    
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Table 7: Robustness Check with Other Variable of Channel of Internal Monetary Transmission 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) -0.257 -0.117 -0.321 -0.216
(0.263) (0.516) (0.340) (0.667)
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) 0.814 11.268** 0.408 16.440*** -0.045 0.642 0.004 0.780
(1.392) (5.176) (1.780) (4.485) (0.303) (1.131) (0.435) (1.205)
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) -0.001 (0.027)
(0.151) (0.745)
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) 0.566 1.989 -0.002 -0.024
(1.276) (5.604) (0.210) (0.367)
Ʃ Z (i, t-1) 0.254 0.304 0.759 0.356 -0.150 -0.015 -0.457 -0.189
(1.124) (1.146) (1.624) (1.914) (0.648) (0.599) (0.686) (0.643)
Ʃ Liquidity Ratio (i, t-1) -0.717 -0.739 -0.691 -0.931 -0.788 -0.803 -0.775 -1.016
(0.859) (0.890) (0.838) (0.905) (0.881) (0.880) (0.840) (0.897)
Ʃ Capital Ratio (i, t-1) -0.397 -0.076 -0.654 -0.354 -0.499 -0.369 -0.854 -0.331
(0.753) (0.799) (0.775) (0.786) (0.976) (0.963) (1.087) (1.034)
Ʃ Log. Total Asset (j, t-1) 0.453** 0.508*** 0.364 0.506* 0.371 0.373* 0.233 0.385
(0.194) (0.182) (0.281) (0.283) (0.225) (0.203) (0.277) (0.254)
Ʃ OF Policy (j, t) -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Ʃ FDI Inflow (j, t) 0.018 0.047 0.018 0.039
(0.070) (0.067) (0.072) (0.062)
0.667 0.824*
(0.413) (0.434)
-1.041** -1.290***
(0.417) (0.428)
0.627** 0.565**
(0.244) (0.287)
0.047 0.299
(0.247) (0.329)
0.293 -0.871 -0.556 -0.855
(3.060) (1.427) 0.963 (1.023)
-8.930** -12.515*** -0.301 -0.392
(4.135) (4.148) 0.754 (0.833)
-3.643** -3.525 -0.233 -0.170
(1.928) (2.110) 0.660 (0.862)
1.276 -0.052 0.536 1.215
(2.505) (2.495) 0.686 (0.853)
-0.014
(0.624)
0.124
(0.347)
-0.030
(0.267)
-0.339
(0.251)
-5.338 -0.822*
(5.142) (0.442)
1.589 0.819**
(1.873) (0.373)
1.586 0.206
(1.709) (0.434)
1.714 -0.481
(2.067) (0.305)
 Ratio of Non-Resident Deposit to Liabilit Z: Ratio of FX Deposit to Liabilities
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x Collateral Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x USD Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x Long-term Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x USD Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Long-term Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Business Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) x Collateral Dummy
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) x USD Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) x Long-term Dummy
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x Business Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) x Business Dummy
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) x Collateral Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) x USD Dummy
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Collateral Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) x Long-term Dummy
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) x Business Dummy 
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Table 7: Robustness Check with Other Variable of Channel of Internal Monetary Transmission 
 (Cont.) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Time-Currency Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Sector Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Maturity Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time- Security Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-Sector-Currency-Maturity-Security Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -5.182 -6.138 -3.796 -5.914 -3.833 -4.024 -1.376 -4.033
(3.280) (2.981) (4.785) (4.771) (4.042) (3.684) (4.993) (4.641)
Number of Obseravations 4,119 4,119 3,902 3,902 4,139 4,139 3,922 3,922
R-squared 0.794 0.797 0.794 0.798 0.793 0.794 0.793 0.796
 Ratio of Non-Resident Deposit to Liabilit Z: Ratio of FX Deposit to Liabilities
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using data of loan disbursements and balance sheets of Cambodian 
commercial banks provided by National Bank of Cambodia, data from financial statements of each 
commercial banks, and data from the International Financial Statistics. ***,**, and * represent statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The fixed-effect OLS estimation is used for each column. 
In order to capture the effects over one year, each model included 3 lags of each independent variable and 
its contemporaneous measure at k=0. The values in each column show the cumulative values of estimated 
coefficients of all lagged variables, and two-way clustered robust standard errors at the bank- and 
quarter-level are presented in parentheses. The sample period spanned from 2013Q1-2019Q2. Z(i, t-1) 
represent the measure of foreign funding exposure. In columns 1-4, the ratio of non-resident deposits to 
total liabilities are adopted as Z(i, t-1). In columns 5-8, the ratio of FX deposits to total liabilities are 
adopted as Z(i, t-1). I(t) represents the treatment dummy which takes one if Z(i, t-1) is not zero. US policy 
(t) represents the US federal fund rate, and FC Policy (t, j) represents the monetary policy rate in banks’ 
shareholders’ home countries.   
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis of Funding Flows to Foreign Monetary Policy 
To confirm which funding sources are important to channel monetary policy, we further 
examined the following equation using bank-level data. 
 
𝛥𝛥 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙� 𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿 𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡�= 𝛼𝛼 + Σ𝑘𝑘=03 𝛾𝛾1𝑘𝑘𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 ⋅ 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 + Σ𝑘𝑘=03 𝛾𝛾2𝑘𝑘𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 ⋅ 𝐹𝐹𝐵𝐵 𝑃𝑃𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘+ Σ𝑘𝑘=03 𝛾𝛾3𝑘𝑘𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘−1 + Σ𝑘𝑘=03 𝛾𝛾4𝑘𝑘𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 + 𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡 (4) 
 
Where 𝛥𝛥 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙�𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃𝑙𝑙𝐿𝐿 𝐹𝐹𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑜𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗,𝑡𝑡� is the log growth of (i) non-resident liabilities, (ii) 
resident deposits, and (iii) equity for bank i with a majority of owners from country j at time t.16   
                                            
16 In our data, it is not possible to separate equity finance according to foreign or domestic sources. 
Thus, we just examine the correlation between the gross paid-up capital and monetary policy rates of 
foreign countries. 
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Each specification included 3 lags of each independent variable and its contemporaneous 
measure at k=0, in order to capture the effects over one year. In this analysis, we examined the 
coefficient of US monetary and other foreign countries’ monetary policies. The results are 
presented in Table 8. We estimated the models in the fixed-effect OLS estimation. In the table, 
we presented the cumulative effects of all lags for each variable. The standard errors are 
calculated with a cluster robust method at the bank-level. 
Table 8: Sensitivity Analysis of Funding Flows to Foreign Monetary Policy 
Log Growth of 
Non-Resident 
Liabilities
Log Growth of 
Resident 
Deposits
Log Growth of 
Equity
Ʃ Ratio of Non-Resident Funding (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) -0.493* -0.083 -0.005
(0.247) (0.086) (0.031)
Ʃ Ratio of Non-Resident Funding (i, t-1) x FC Policy(t) -0.208 0.077 -0.044*
(0.188) (0.069) (0.025)
Ʃ Ratio of Non-Resident Funding (i, t-1) -1.062** 0.273** -0.023
(0.468) (0.132) (0.042)
Ʃ Liquidity Ratio (i, t-1) -0.167 -0.128 -0.077*
(0.317) (0.131) (0.040)
Ʃ Capital Ratio (i, t-1) 0.567 0.517*** -0.081
(0.381) (0.174) (0.069)
Ʃ Log. Total Asset (j, t-1) 0.100 -0.081* -0.016
(0.138) (0.047) (0.017)
Ʃ FC Policy (j, t) (0.011) (-0.004) (0.006)
(0.058) (0.014) (0.005)
Ʃ Capital inFlow (j, t) 0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Time Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Bank Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.499  1.377* 0.294
(0.828) (0.780) (0.283 )
Number of Observations 646 717 701
R-Squared Adjusted 0.155  0.213   0.217
Source: ***,**, and * represent statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The fixed-effect 
estimation is used for each column. In order to capture the effects over one year, each specification 
included 4 lags of each independent variable and its contemporaneous measure at k=0. The values in each 
column show the cumulative values of estimated coefficients of all lagged variable, and the clustered 
robust standard errors at bank-level. The values in each cell show the cumulative values of estimated 
coefficients of all lagged variables. The sample period spanned from 2013Q1-2019Q2.  
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We find that interactions with US monetary policy rates are significantly and negatively 
associated only with the growth of non-resident liabilities at 10% significance. However, of the 
results have no statistical significance in other funding growth. This supports our view that 
non-resident liabilities are the key factor in shaping the channel of international monetary 
transmission in Cambodia. The shareholders’ home country’s monetary policy is not statistically 
significant in column 1, although the sign of the coefficient is negative. In column 3, the 
shareholders’ home country’s monetary policy is negative at 10% significance, although the 
point estimation is lower than in column 1.  
However, as De Haas and Lelyveld (2010) empirically showed, the economic conditions 
within shareholders’ home countries are also factors behind the fluctuation of funding costs for 
banks. The results could be subject to omitted variable biases particularly in the correlation 
between monetary policy and funding flows. However, the investigation of the exact factors 
influencing funding flows are outside the scope of our study.   
 
5. Conclusion 
Globalization in the banking sector and an increase in foreign funding flows increase the 
likelihood of financial contagion and vulnerability to external shocks within the banking sector. 
In particular, US monetary policy plays a role in increasing or decreasing the cost of foreign 
funding through international money markets, which are sometimes dominant funding sources 
for banks in developing countries.  
In our study, we investigated the international monetary transmission of US and other 
foreign countries’ monetary policy during 2013Q1-2019Q2 into Cambodian commercial banks 
through the channel of non-resident liabilities. Specifically, we exploit unique data that allow us 
to measure the amounts of exposure to changes in foreign funding flows and also investigate in 
detail amounts of newly disbursed loans by loan characteristics on a quarterly basis. Our paper 
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provides empirical evidence that US monetary policy is transmitted through non-resident 
liabilities into bank domestic lending in Cambodia, and the funding from foreign banks, such as 
parent companies and associated banks, is a particularly important channel. We also find that the 
monetary policies of banks’ shareholders’ home countries are not strongly associated with 
Cambodian banks’ domestic lending compared to US monetary policy, although there was a 
distributional effect on some specific loan types, such as USD and long-term loans. Furthermore, 
we found that US monetary policy also affected allocations of domestic bank loans. Specifically, 
the increases in the cost of funding from abroad facilitates the provision of USD currency loans, 
secured loans, long-term loans, and consumer loans. This might suggest that foreign monetary 
policy led Cambodian banks to shift loan allocations to lower risk sectors and clients.   
The Cambodian financial sector is still underdeveloped and vulnerable to political 
shocks, and the capacity to serve as the lender of last resort is limited due to dollarization, while 
non-resident liabilities comprise substantial shares of the banking sector in the last decade.  It 
may be worth noting that diversifying the ownership of foreign affiliation might be one strategy 
to stabilize the financial sector. This is needed not to only permit banks to collect funds from 
abroad, but also to make them commit to collecting domestic funds. In the case of Cambodia, 
bank ownership is concentrated in neighboring countries, some of which are still among 
developed countries, with financial systems and economies still vulnerable to shocks. In addition, 
most firms are strongly dependent on the funding from abroad. Further diversification of bank 
ownership and a commitment from foreign banks to collect domestic funds is necessary.   
Looking at de-dollarization from the policy-making view, a better understanding of 
monetary transmission is important in order to properly control the supply of local and foreign 
currencies through banks. In the literature of dollarization, Ongena et al. (2016) find that foreign 
currency lending was less likely to be affected by domestic monetary policy in a dollarized 
economy, and rather foreign monetary policy has an impact on foreign currency lending. In the 
case of Cambodia, 90% of bank lending is in USD. Thus, the domestic monetary policy is less 
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likely to affect the bank supply. However, our study revealed that the effects of foreign monetary 
policy is likely to be channeled through foreign funding exposure.This indicates that banks in 
Cambodia could mitigate the effect of foreign monetary policy by collecting domestic funds, and 
governments could be required to support that funding through deposits for those banks.  
Furthermore, our finding that the rising costs of funding from abroad led to increases in 
USD lending has implications for policies that promote the local currency. Since collecting local 
currency deposits are costly in the sense that interest rates on local deposits are higher than USD 
deposits, the availability of cheaper foreign funds might affect lending in local currency. Banks 
can swap the local currency with USD through the currency swap operation by National Bank of 
Cambodia, which is called as “local currency collateralized provision operation.” In this 
operation, banks can obtain local currency liquidity in exchange for USD liquidity as collateral. 
The increases in funding costs from abroad might have decreased banks’ USD funds for this 
operation. 
There are limitations on our analysis. Our study revealed that there were distributional 
effects of US monetary policy across types of loans, for example, between business loans and 
consumer loans. However, due to data limitations, our study did not identify what types of firms 
and consumers were particularly affected by the policy. An increase in the cost of funding could 
have a larger impact on lending to SMEs since the costs of SME lending, such as monitoring 
costs, are relatively higher than lending to large firms. If this is the case, the distributional impact 
across firm sizes could affect the structure of an industry, and pose a long-term effect in the 
industry. Therefore, an investigation into this heterogeneity in the monetary policy effect among 
borrowers could have important implications from the perspectives of industrial organization 
and policy-making. Future study is required to investigate the distributional effects across 
borrowers in detail by employing granular data at the borrower-level.   
In addition, the determinants of funding costs and funding flows into Cambodian banks are not 
sufficiently investigated by our study. Apart from monetary policies, other economic conditions 
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within shareholders’ home countries and the US could be factors behind funding costs and the 
fluctuations of funding flows. Such omitted variable biases could cause the insignificance in the 
correlation between monetary policy and bank lending. Apart from shareholders’ countries of 
origin, it is also necessary to identify the exact origins of funding. In fact, the sources of foreign 
funding are not limited to parent banks, and there is an increasing number of investments into 
Cambodian banks due to the high interest rates in the Cambodian financial market. However, the 
investigation of funding flows is outside the scope of our study. Future study should consider 
recent capital inflows into the banking sector of developing countries.      
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Appendix Table 1: Definition of Variables  
 
Variable  Definition 
Loansi,s,b,c,m,t  The amounts of loans disbursed in quarter t by bank i. Subscript 
s stands for whether loans are secured or unsecured. Subscript c 
stands for whether loans are in USD or local currency. Subscript 
b stands for whether loans are for business loans or consumer 
loans. Subscript m stands for whether maturity of loans are 
more than one year or less than one year.  
Data is provided from National Bank of Cambodia. 
Ratio of Other Foreign Liabilitiesit The ratio of other foreign liabilities to total liabilities. The 
foreign liabilities are calculated as non-resident liabilities minus 
non-resident deposits. Data is from National Bank of Cambodia. 
Ratio of Non-Resodent Liabilitiesi,t Bank i’s ratio of non-resident liabilities to total liabilities at 
quarter t. Non-resident liabilities are the sum of non-resident 
deposits and wholesale funding from abroad. Data is from 
National Bank of Cambodia.  
Capital Ratioi,t Bank i’s capital-to-asset ratio at quarter t. Data is from National 
Bank of Cambodia. 
Liquidity Ratioi,t Bank i’s ratio of liquid asset to total asset at quarter t. Data is 
from National Bank of Cambodia. 
US Policyt US federal fund rate at quarter t. Data source is International 
Financial Statistics. 
OF Policyj,t Monetary policy rate in bank’s major shareholders’ home 
country j. Data source is International Financial Statistics. 
FDI inflowj,t The amounts of FDI from country j into Cambodia at quarter t. 
We standardize the rate by subtracting mean and dividing by 
standard errors of the monetary policy. 
Data is provided from Council of Development in Cambodia 
Ratio of Non-Resident Depositit The ratio of non-resident deposits to total liabilities. Data is 
from National Bank of Cambodia. 
Ratio of FX Depositit The ratio of FX deposits to total liabilities. FX deposits are 
composed of foreign currency denominated resident deposits and 
non-resident deposits. Data is from National Bank of Cambodia. 
Log. Growths of Non-Resident 
Liabilitiesi,t  
Logarithm of growths of non-resident liabilities 
(log(Non-Resident Liabilitiesi,t / Non-Resident Liabilitiesi,t-1) 
Data is from National Bank of Cambodia. 
Log. Growths of Equityi,t  Logarithm of growths of paid-up capital (log(equityi,t / equityi,t-1). 
Data is from National Bank of Cambodia. 
Log. Growths of Resident Depositi,t  Logarithm of growths of resident deposit (log(Resident Depositi,t 
/ Resident Depositi,t-1). Data is from National Bank of Cambodia. 
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Appendix Table 2: Correlation Matrix 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
(1) Ratio of Non-resident Liablities 1.00
(2) Capital Ratio -0.22 1.00
(3) Liquidity Ratio -0.22 0.20 1.00
(4) Log. Total Asset -0.01 -0.72 -0.05 1.00
(5) Total Assets -0.13 -0.33 0.00 0.77 1.00
(6) Capital Flow 0.28 -0.02 0.14 0.04 -0.11 1.00
(7) Log. Growth of Non-Resident Liabilities 0.01 -0.07 0.01 0.14 0.10 0.08 1.00
(8) Log. Growth of Resident Deposits -0.07 0.05 0.09 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 0.02 1.00
(9) Log. Growth of Equity 0.06 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.00 1.00
(10) Ratio of FX Deposit to Liabilities -0.42 -0.59 0.03 0.58 0.31 -0.14 0.04 0.02 -0.01 1.00
(11) Ratio of Non-Resident Deposits 0.93 -0.18 -0.15 -0.02 -0.10 0.27 0.01 -0.06 0.06 -0.52 1.00
(12) Ratio of Other Foreign Liabilities 0.25 -0.13 -0.19 0.03 -0.10 0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.02 0.24 -0.13 1.00
Source: Author’s calculations using data of loan disbursements and balance sheets of Cambodian 
commercial banks provided by National Bank of Cambodia, data from financial statements of each 
commercial banks, and data from the International Financial Statistics 
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Appendix Table 3: Estimation Results (Step-wise) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) -1.997*** -1.520* -0.940*** -0.696*** -1.573*** -3.811*** -0.818*** -0.215
(0.483) (0.817) (0.303) (0.267) (0.352) (1.474) (0.303) (0.184)
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) -4.699*** -6.302* -1.350* -0.439 -6.600*** -7.683*** -2.495** -1.359*
(1.458) (3.540) (0.728) (0.565) (1.584) (2.142) (1.097) (0.775)
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) 0.491*** -1.047* 0.088 0.052 0.576** -0.538*** -0.050 0.043
(0.183) (0.546) (0.151) (0.154) (0.251) (0.192) (0.165) (0.152)
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) -0.637 3.055 -1.067*** 0.226 0.388 0.854 -0.656* 0.365
(0.945) (2.400) (0.433) (0.515) (0.689) (1.703) (0.357) (0.470)
Ʃ Z (i, t-1) -0.167 -0.265 -0.313 -0.378 0.228 0.102 -0.023 -0.019
(0.518) (0.522) (0.495) (0.476) (0.422) (0.461) (0.430) (0.404)
Ʃ Liquidity Ratio (i, t-1) -0.862 -0.698 -0.455 -0.482 -0.921 -0.614 -0.322 -0.532
(0.845) (0.800) (0.806) (0.786) (0.839) (0.801) (0.808) (0.789)
Ʃ Capital Ratio (i, t-1) 0.929 -0.795 -0.399 -0.598 0.705 -1.020* -0.509 -0.732
(0.974) (0.625) (0.718) (0.745) (0.929) (0.608) (0.674) (0.720)
Ʃ Log. Total Asset (j, t-1) 0.828*** 0.387 0.508* 0.507* 0.734** 0.253 0.4498 0.421
(0.324) (0.250) (0.275) (0.281) (0.309) (0.248) (0.267) (0.270)
Ʃ OF Policy (j, t) -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ʃ FDI Inflow (j, t) 0.059 -0.009 0.016 0.019 0.042 -0.003 0.024 0.019
(0.069) (0.065) (0.067) (0.068) (0.070) (0.066) (0.069) (0.070)
1.638*** 1.427***
(0.500) (0.421)
0.888 3.437**
(0.730) (1.448)
0.784**
0.571** (0.343)
(0.250) -0.271
0.116 (0.253)
3.972*** (0.327) 5.207***
(1.356) (1.323)
5.192 6.008***
(3.564) (2.195)
0.979
0.243 (1.158)
(0.911) -1.098
-1.705** (0.866)
(0.813) -0.684**
-0.579*** (0.263)
(0.224) 0.548***
1.095** (0.179)
(0.547) 0.011
-0.143 (0.231)
(0.227) -0.242
-0.198 (0.202)
(0.223)
0.568 -0.317
(0.969) (0.956)
-3.210 -0.894
(2.546) (1.851)
1.333*** 0.885
(0.478) (0.566)
-0.715 -0.787
(0.541) (0.564)
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x Collateral Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x USD Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x Long-term Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x US Policy (t) x Business Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Collateral Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x USD Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Long-term Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z  (i, t-1) x US Policy (t) x Business Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) x Collateral Dummy
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) x USD Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) x Long-term Dummy
Ʃ I (i) x OF Policy (t) x Business Dummy
Z: Ratio of Foreign Wholesale Borrowing to Total  
Liabilities
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) x Collateral Dummy 
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) x USD Dummy
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) x Long-term Dummy
Ʃ I (i) x Z (i, t-1) x OF Policy (t) x Business Dummy 
Z: Ratio Non-Resident Liabilities  to Total 
Liabilities
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Appendix Table 3: Estimation Results (Step-wise) (Cont.) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Time-Currency Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Sector Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time-Maturity Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time- Security Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-Sector-Currency-Maturity-Security Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -10.982 -3.872 -5.965 -5.959 -9.434 -1.494 -5.071 -4.590
(5.469) (4.250) (4.663) (4.776) (5.158) (4.207) (4.469) 4.561
Number of Obseravations 3,959.000 3,959.000 3,959.000 3,959.000 3,902.000 3,902.000 3,902.000 3,902.000
R-squared 0.796 0.793 0.795 0.794 0.801 0.797 0.798 0.797
Z: Ratio Non-Resident Liabilities  to Total 
Liabilities
Z: Ratio of Foreign Wholesale Borrowing to Total  
Liabilities
Source: Author’s calculations using data of loan disbursements and balance sheets of Cambodian 
commercial banks provided by National Bank of Cambodia, data from financial statements of each 
commercial banks, and data from the International Financial Statistics. ***,**, and * represent statistical 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. The fixed-effect OLS estimation is used for each column. 
In order to capture the effects over one year, each model included 3 lags of each independent variable and 
its contemporaneous measure at k=0. The values in each column show the cumulative values of estimated 
coefficients of all lagged variables, and two-way clustered robust standard errors at the bank- and 
quarter-level is presented in parentheses. The sample period spanned from 2013Q1-2019Q2. Z(i, t-1) 
represent the measure of foreign funding exposure. In columns 1-4, the ratio of non-resident liabilities to 
total liabilities are adopted as Z(i, t-1). In columns 5-8, the ratio of other liabilities to total liabilities are 
adopted as Z(i, t-1). I(t) represents the treatment dummy which takes one if Z(i, t-1) is not zero. US policy 
(t) represents the US federal fund rate, and FC Policy (t, j) represents the monetary policy rate in banks’
shareholders’ home countries.
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Abstruct (in Japanese) 
要約 
開発途上国の銀行は外国からの資金に高く依存する傾向があり、そのような外部資
金への依存は外国の金融政策の影響を受けやすくなるといった脆弱性を銀行セクター
にもたらすことが考えられる。特に、海外の政策金利の増減は金融機関の資本コスト
の変化を通じて、金融機関の貸出行動に影響を与えることが考えられる。本稿では、
2013 年第一四半期から 2019 年第二四半期までの銀行の新規貸出とバランスシートの
データを用いて米国政策金利の変更やその他の外国の金融政策の変更のカンボジアの
銀行貸出への波及効果を検証した。カンボジアは東南アジアでは最も発展が遅れてい
る国の一つであり、金融セクターが高度にドル化し、資本移動の制約がない。このよ
うな環境は、海外の金融ショックが銀行の国内貸出を通じて、カンボジア経済に影響
を及ぼしやすいと考えられる。 
分析の結果、外国からの資金に依存している銀行ほど 2015年第四四半期以降の米国
金利の上昇に対し、貸出を減少させる傾向があることが示された。これは、米国の政
策金利の上昇に応じて海外からの資本のコストが上昇したため、それに依存していた
銀行が貸出を減らさざるを得なくなったためと考えられる。また、分析では、政策金
利の上昇は新規貸出の配分にも影響を与えていたこともわかった。特に、米国金利上
昇に対し、米国ドル建て貸出、消費者向け貸出、担保付貸出の割合が増える傾向にあ
ることがわかった。これは、資本コストの上昇に対し、銀行がリスクのより低い貸出
へと貸出行動を変えていたことを示す結果であると考えられる。以上の結果に関して、
米国金利の変化に関しては様々な分析モデルで頑健な結果が得られたが、銀行の主要
な株主の母国の金融政策に関しては頑健な結果が得られなかった。つまり、カンボジ
アのような高度にドル化した開発途上国では、米国政策金利の動向が国内のマクロ経
済の安定性に影響を与える重要なファクターであることが示唆される結果であった。            
 
 
キーワード: 銀行貸出チャネル、国際的な金融政策効果の波及、資本流入、開発途上
国、ドル化、カンボジア 
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